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samchung15

samchung15 has written 17 posts for Cycling Trivialities

A short Poem: The River

Behold the creator of all things good,

The arrogance of man-kind,

Save the trees, eat 5 a day, adopt a pet,

Thousands born on the wrong side of the river,

No raft shared to get across,

They remain tethered and unused on the other side,

Out of reach, wilting in their disuse,

People aware but awkward and restricted,

Blinded and occupied with the trivial,

Story’s of arks & doves distort the calmness of the river,

Fairytales of fear and commands,

No man crosses the river,

Whilst the strength lies with other men,

The pure of heart drown in the great divide,

For both sides are mirrored wastes,

Too much & too little,

Too little & too much,

Too many will drown for a bridge of flesh & bones,

Until only two remain,

Go forth and multiply,

So we can start the cycle again.

 

S.C. 2013

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Post 9/11 and post Iraq-War U.S. Intelligence reforms

 

The political fallout and media interest in American intelligence gathering and implementation following 9/11 and the Iraq War, prompted the American government to reform various parts of the American intelligence community. This led the Bush (Junior) administration to pass an intelligence reform in 2004 based on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission found and highlighted intelligence failures within the community leading up to the 9/11 attacks. The Counterterrorism Centre (CTC) in the view of the 9/11 Commission had failed to analyse from the enemy’s perspective (‘red team’ analysis) and therefore failed to recognise that suicide terrorism had become a principle tactic of Middle Eastern Terrorists.[1]   The intelligence community as a whole had also not developed the requirements to gather intelligence on the threat of aircraft hijacking and therefore there were no such indicators for personnel to monitor.[2] Intelligence failures such as these led to the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), through the legislation passed by the Bush administration in 2004.[3]  The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) would overlook the whole intelligence community and become the central point of responsibility in coordinating efforts of the various intelligence departments.

The creation of such an office would ultimately tackle the apparent lack of communication between departments leading up to the 9/11 attacks. After all the intelligence community was aware that an attack was imminent weeks before it happened, but no one could determine how, where or when it would. [4] This was a move to tackle what the 9/11 Commission saw as a lack of unison within the intelligence community causing the intelligence failures that subsequently led to the attacks. The DNI would replace the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and would maintain as much leverage in the intelligence community as the old DCI, through the creation of centres such as the National Counterterrorism centre and the siphoning of staff from CIA to the National Intelligence Centre and thus treating the director of the CIA as a deputy.[5] Although this would improve intelligence flow between some departments, Richard K. Betts argues that the creation of more centres increases the risk of larger gaps in intelligence coverage as centres tend to focus excessively on old problems.[6] The creation of such centres would not tackle CTC’s failure to ‘join the dots’ leading up to the 9/11 attacks, if anything this suggests that the creation of more centres would increase this risk.

It would be harsh to put the blame solely on the CTC, as the reforms aimed to tackle the lack of interdepartmental communication regarding this intelligence failure. The CIA had taken too long to put terrorist Al Mihdhar on the state department watch list and did not notify FBI that he had a visa allowing repeated travel to the U.S., on top of this the FBI was focused mostly on investigating for criminal prosecuting rather for general intelligence gathering, and confusion about legal requirements blocked the sharing of information.[7] The creation of the DNI was implemented to help departments work together and create an intelligence community that could coordinate efforts on counterterrorism. In the view of the 9/11 Commission the intelligence community had failed to provide the needed ‘warning’ that such as attack was imminent. However the FBI issued more than ‘200 warnings the year of the attack, 6 of them mentioning airports or airlines’, the CTC had also expressed deep concerns that upcoming attacks would be ‘larger and more deadly’, just months before 9/11.[8] This would suggest that it wasn’t a failure in the collection of the intelligence, as the community was aware of a threat, but more how the intelligence was used and analysed. The important signals intelligence was not translated until after the attacks, this is the type of intelligence failure that Betts refers to as an ‘inherent enemy of intelligence’.[9] It is near impossible to uncover important intelligence in the mass of signals intelligence and ‘chatter’ even if analysts have a clear reference or the intelligence agency has a mass workforce.

The intelligence community could shift to the use of more concise methods of intelligence gathering, such as human intelligence, as Betts states ‘the best way to intercept attacks is to penetrate the organisations’.[10] Although the same can be said for signals intelligence, there is a risk of false intelligence and the development of credible worldwide HUMINT networks can take years to develop and can force cooperation with unsavoury individuals. The use of HUMINT would also highlight the ethnocentric failures of analysts in the American intelligence community. The CTC had failed to identify the use of suicide terrorism within Al Qaeda’s tactics and culture. How can the intelligence community fight an enemy that it does not fully understand? Betts suggests that to fully tackle the problem a ‘mass revision of educational norms and the restoration of the prestige of public services are needed,’ however this would take years to achieve.[11] This leads to the revision of the intelligence communities ‘warning threshold’ as the intelligence community knew an attack was imminent before 9/11 but no action was taken. Betts suggests that there is no perfect threshold, as a threshold that is too sensitive carries a ‘cry wolf’ aspect in contrast to a threshold that is too high that increases the risk of attack.[12] Betts view of intelligence is that it is a system that should be viewed as one that is a ‘glass half full’ rather than an empty vessel.  Intelligence can only act on the information it receives and successfully analyses. The 9/11 attacks were blamed by the 9/11 Commission, on the intelligence communities failure to ‘join the dots’, on the other hand the false intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was a case of joining dots that were not there, possibly due to pressure from the policymakers and government themselves.

The reforms of 2004 also called for a better relationship between policymakers and intelligence analysts. Betts suggests that the policymakers were at just as much fault as the intelligence agencies leading up to 9/11 as the Bush administration failed to make counterterrorism as high a priority as the intelligence community suggested.[13] This is further supported by an article in The New York Times by 28 year CIA veteran Paul R. Pillar as he wrote that ‘policy change generally only comes as a result from disasters’ and are rarely implemented before, as ‘repeated warnings from intelligence are usually deemed not sufficient enough to change national priorities’.[14] This suggests a lack of understanding between the needs of each of the policymaker and intelligence analyst. This is apparent regarding the search for WMD’s in Iraq, as although the relationship is unclear, there is an argument that intelligence became politicised, and intelligence was influenced by policymakers needs.[15]

There was much political pressure on intelligence to find policymakers a credible political reason to go into Iraq. In Ex-Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz’s view, the closer the relationship between policymaker and intelligence analyst the better. He goes on to state that the analyst has to ‘understand the policymaker’s intense commitment to the success of his policy and that challenges to policy assumptions have to be handled carefully.’[16] Betts has his own take on Wolfowitz’s theory as he claims that when tension emerges between the policymakers and analysts, politicisation is inevitable, after all intelligence serves policy.[17] Betts suggests that politicisation is an innocent enemy of intelligence as the roots of politicisation lie within the contradictions between the analytical process of professional norms and political unity, and of the accuracy needed in analysis and influence over policy.[18] Because intelligence ultimately serves policy, and intelligence often works through calculated predictions of raw intelligence, whereas policymakers need hard facts, the solution needed is more than a closer relationship. Based on the lack of WMD’s in Iraq, a higher ‘warning threshold’ and action only on accurate intelligence could be one such solution however, such a solution can still lead to complacency and therefore the risk of acting too late. It must also be noted that an relationship that is too distant between policymaker and analysts can also cause problems, as the analysts ‘have no way of knowing whether the policymakers want, need, or even use the “objective analysis” they churn out.’[19]

The creation of the DNI and the centralisation of the intelligence community due to the lack of cooperation between departments leading up to 9/11, would improve the efficiency of the organisation. Centralisation can also however, lead to overconcentration on a single task and suppress diversity and innovation of independent agencies.[20] This can be tackled if each department is allocated funds by an independent source of which has no vested interest in the intelligence community. However, Robert Gates former Director of Central Intelligence argues that unless ‘the DNI had authority over 80 percent of the annual intelligence budget allocated to the Pentagon, the DNI would be ineffectual’.[21] Too much decentralisation however, can create duplication and inefficiency but through overlapping responsibilities increase the level of coverage.[22] Betts suggests that the intelligence community should be decentralised to give operators and analyst’s latitude in thinking and problem solving but also centralised to ensure prompt and coordinated responses to intelligence threats.[23] This would call for better methods of coordination between departments, which would be achieved through the oversight of the DNI, but runs the risk of an intelligence community that has narrow goals and coverage, rather than one that tackles a wide range of potential national threats.

There is no easy fix to intelligence and the reforms often focus too much on the failures on intelligence rather than its many successes. Betts states that many reformers have very little knowledge of the intelligence process and therefore lack the ‘perspective’ to solve the deeper problems within intelligence.[24] Betts also argues that many prosecutors of intelligence fail to recognise the role of outside enemies and the fact that intelligence faces a battle against ‘conscious counterstrategies’.[25] Intelligence has many problems that cannot be resolved, which suggests that, the American intelligence community is not as strong as the weapons it possesses but is as strong as the weapons that its enemies do not possess.


[1] The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report on the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 347

[2] The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report on the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 347

[3] Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, The Cultural Revolution in Intelligence: Interim Report, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2. 2008 pp. 47–61 p.47

[4] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 105

[5] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 154

[6] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 154

[7] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 154

[8] Joshua Rovner, Why Intelligence isn’t to Blame for 9/11, MIT Centre for International Studies, 05-13, 2005, p. 1

[9] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 14

[10] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, ColumbiaUniversity Press 2007, p. 128

[11] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, ColumbiaUniversity Press 2007, p. 132

[12] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 23

[13] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, ColumbiaUniversity Press 2007, p. 106

[14] Paul R. Pillar. “A Scapegoat is not a Solution.” New York Times. 4th June 2004.

[15] Robert Jervis, Reports, Politics and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq, The Journal of Strategic Studies vol. 29, no. 1, 2006, pp. 3 – 52, p.6

[16] Jack Davis, Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations, CIA Studies, 1996, pp.35-42. p. 40

[17] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 67

[18] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 69

[19] Kerbel and Olcott. “The Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers.” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 4 (Dec. 2010): 1-13, p. 12

[20] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 148

[21] Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, The Cultural Revolution in Intelligence: Interim Report, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2. 2008 pp. 47–61 p.49

[22] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 148

[23] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 149

[24] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 3

[25] Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Knowledge & Power in American National Security, Columbia University Press 2007, p. 11

Jumping on the Bandwagon: View of Footballers after the Olympic Sucess

I for one completely agree that footballers are massively overpaid for the role in which they play in our society. It is my belief however, that it is in fact us, the general public, whom have to take some responsibility for the way things have panned out in top level football. Now I am not saying that footballers shouldn’t be held accountable for their own actions, although many appear to be a pack of gullible lemmings, but what I am saying is the clear need for many football fans to know about top players personal lives has forced some, not all, towards coping with media pressure in the ‘wrong way’. I put ‘wrong way’ in inverted commas as what constitutes ‘enjoying yourself’ and ‘irresponsible’ are up for personal interpretation.

What the British success of the Olympics has shown is the real agony and ecstasy of competing at the top level of any form of competitive sport. The connection that we felt with many of these athletes were similar to that of the connection that many football fans would have experienced supporting their local club up until the 1980s. These athletes, the majority, are not paid so much money that, although they are only 40 yards away from you in the stand, they seem thousands of miles away as human beings. This should not be the case perhaps we ask too much of footballers and this seems justified by their incredibly high earnings.

A successful career used to be about winning things, now it’s about how much money you end up with – Graeme Souness

The Olympics were a great success not just down to the athletes but also to the amazing support inside the Stadium. There was no booing when a Team GB athlete underperformed just support. I know it is difficult to compare the atmosphere of the Olympics to a Premier League football game but it doesn’t help. The problem of abuse from crowds at football is a problem that goes way back to when the first organised teams and leagues were set up. Now-a-days we just shrug off the personal abuse we shout at players by suggesting that they ‘get paid enough to deal with it’, that is not acceptable, would you take a raise at your place of work but under the condition that your boss could shout obscenities at you and humiliate you every time you made a mistake? It is a sensitive issue, a lot has been done in the English game to combat racism and its been a long time since I’ve experienced racism at an English football match, but some players do get an earful. Taunting the opposition and chants against local rivals are a traditional part of the game that adds more passion (to a degree) to the playing field, but personal attacks on individuals just appear petty, as they are in a team of 11, whereas the fans are in a crowd of thousands.

You can also argue that some players deserve the media attention and crowd abuse due to their antics off the pitch. The modern footballer must recognise that they do not have a choice in being made a role model of, naturally children are going to look towards the players of their favourite teams as examples. Recent cases such as John Terry and Ryan Giggs’s actions off the pitch have led to many back page headlines. This however would suggest to me that the tabloids will run the hell out of any scandal story involving a footballer as we all regrettably want to know their every dark secret. This is the main reason, in my opinion, why there are very few openly gay footballers in the past and present game, coupled with the obvious abuse the player would receive from opposition fans.

My final point is that we all know a negative story attracts more media attention than a positive one. Watch the news, the main headline is always surrounded by corruption or death, and rightly so these matters should be at the forefront of our awareness, should we really care that John Terry is sleeping around? There are plenty more like him in the world, why can’t we focus on the footballers that do loads for charity and put these pre-Madonna’s in their place. Didier Drogba gave all his advertising money to charity, built a hospital in his home town in Ivory Coast, Craig Bellamy has a football foundation set up with his own money for underprivileged kids in Sierra Leone and we rarely see articles praising the model professionals of the game who stay when training is finished to get further practise in. The problem is that many of the big players were most probably once of these hard working individuals but with success in football apparently comes a big ego. Look at Robin Van Persie, he arguably carried Arsenal last season and is a well known Arsenal supporter, but yet we see him move to Premier League rivals Manchester United in the search for trophies. Not much of a dedicated Arsenal fan is he? He’s had one good season and left, despite Arsenal sticking by him through an endless list of injuries . Perhaps football is too focused on success rather than heritage or loyalty and respect, Clint Dempsey refusing to play for Fulham in order to engineer himself a transfer is a recent example of this.

Why has this happened? Football was taken from the working classes and made into a global business and franchise which like with anything that expands so vastly may soon suffer from imperial overstretch. As wages rise, so do ticket prices and the price of the most average of players, we see more empty corporate seats, not because no one has paid for them but rather the person who could afford it enjoys the 3 course meal and hospitality suite better than the match itself. We are slowly seeing the sport we all love being taken away from us, but with the coverage of Sky television we can watch it, but never truly experience the sport that once was played by heroes for the badge of a town, village or city. We asked for this change, not directly but as a result of wanting success for our clubs at any cost.

It’s a Two Way Street: There’s nothing wrong with Atheists

Our scientific power has outrun our spiritual power. We have guided missiles and misguided men -Martin Luther King

I completely agree with this quote and I’m more or less an Atheist. In my view spirituality is as personal as ones emotions, and just because a person is not affiliated to a religion it doesn’t necessarily mean that they can’t be spiritual. The thing that annoys me most is how offended religious groups sometimes get when they are questioned. Religion appears to be the only concept of teaching that isn’t allowed to be ‘corrected’ or questioned through time. Generally everything changes, whether it be ideologies or things get questioned or proven wrong, ie. the world is not flat! Apparently being an Atheist your not allowed to say; ‘hang on, this geezer walked on water, performed miracles, turned water into wine and then told his disciples to write a book saying that it is a sin to eat any form of shellfish, I’m not to sure’. I do not mean to offend anyone but this is how I view it and I believe everyone is of equal opinion and if I am wrong, according to you, you can enjoy watching me burn for eternity in hell from heaven. Sounds a bit unchristian but that’s your belief.

I do not discredit the works that religious organisations do, on the contrary, the looking after the homeless, sick and housebound, organised by many forms of religion are fantastic. If a man overcomes an addiction to whatever substance, drugs or alcohol through ‘finding God’ is that not just an excellent form of spiritual guidance? This is why I do not discredit religion totally, but for me it is just spiritual everyone finds it eventually whether its Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist even through, music, sport and other non religious activities, spiritualism can be found.  Sometimes all we need is guidance and if that’s through religion that’s fine! Just don’t start discrediting other peoples belief because you’ve ‘found yourself’ and your ‘one true God’.

‘If Christians are right, 1.6 billion Muslims will burn in eternity, if Muslims are right 2.2 billion Christians will burn in eternity’

I see religion as one entity, like humanity. For example we are humans but we have many races, but in the end we are near enough equal. For me it’s just another form of man made natural categorisation, a way for a group of individuals to inflict their ideals on another group. We had the slave trade and the suppression of races which throughout history went hand in hand with the many crusades and genocides brought about in the name of the ‘one true God’. It is as if we create these categorisations when we have nothing to fight over. Perhaps its human nature that we continually create differences and arguments that contradict one another so we can simply satisfy our need for fight and struggle.

THE CULT FACTOR

Scientology = Cult. Simple, it is not an Atheist club or simply science’s way of combating religion. It is a cult like any other throughout history, it is one man’s word against everyone else’s. You can argue this point about any if not most religion but in my opinion the Mormon religion is the most questionable. Why oh why does the U.S. seem to have so many cults? Simple, education. Throughout history man has created deities in search of answers or reason. Worship the sun god or the rain god, even offer human sacrifice to please these gods in order to get a good harvest. This to me makes more sense then going to a place of worship once a week to pay a religious figure to read a poorly translated Latin script. I saw a documentary on discovery about mummification in Papua New Guinea and how the mummified bodies were visited so that relatives could go and talk to the deceased about problems and look for guidance. The man which the program was focused on had malaria and did not have long left. Christianity was introduced to Papua New Guinea and he feared that if he got mummified he’d go to hell, but if he got a Christian burial he would not be able to meet his mummified family in the afterlife. If God were to send this man to hell for getting mummified, is it not a vengeful and evil act? In some cultures, many tribal, the villagers worship the Devil  to deliver them from doing evil acts or pray to keep the Devil happy so he doesn’t try to manipulate them.

To conclude, my main annoyance is religious people saying that atheists ‘don’t believe in anything’. I for one would like to think that human kindness is something that we have developed as a species and not some God given right. Too long has religion been used as an excuse for terrible acts of atrocity, too long have we tried to inflict religious ideals and traditions on countries, thus losing their historical traditions and identity. It is not until we as a race can account for our own actions as free speaking and free thinking individuals, that we will all emerge as better people. If we all worked together and as one we can achieve the peace and freedom that everyone wants but are too acceptant of the present to work towards. To finish, does an atheist who was charitable all his life go to hell, rather than an religious man who went to church weekly but never put another man before himself?

Thank God for making me an Atheist – Ricky Gervais 

3 Bands to look out for

1. DINOSAUR PILE UP

This band have gripped me by the proverbial ear and haven’t let go. As grungy as Nirvana, as melodic as Biffy Clyro and as rock and roll as Foo Fighters, they are definitely ones to watch. If Dinosaur Pile Up don’t get the true recognition they deserve in the next few years than the music industry is certainly dead. They released their début album ‘Growing Pains’ in 2010 and with tracks such as ‘Traynor’ and ‘Mona Lisa’ the band have showcased some of their true quality. If the next album (expected this year sometime) is as good or better, I expect some larger festival slots for Dinosaur Pile Up in 2013.


2. PULLED APART BY HORSES

The name may be familiar to a few festival goers and even some radio listeners through Zane Lowe. The band have supported Muse and Biffy Clyro on separate tours, credentials that certainly shouldn’t be overlooked. Pulled Apart By Horses are as in your face as you can get without being full on ‘screamo’ and  their live performances are renowned for their energy and passion. They are a band that is definitely on the rise and I see very few obstacles in their way.


3. MILO GREENE
Milo Greene are a 5 piece hailing from Los Angeles, with outstanding vocal harmonies that have been described by many youtube users (I have researched this..sort of) as raising the hairs on your arms and giving goosebumps. I know very little of the band except of what is on youtube, the best advice I can give is to ask you to have a listen yourself.

The Impact of the Combined Bomber Offensive against Axis Europe

The combined bomber offensive against Axis Europe was a topic of much debate among the British Command. The idea of long distance bombing was seen more as a weapon of ‘terror’ rather than an effective form of warfare after the limited experiences involving air power in the First World War.[1]  This may have well proved the case, as early success’s involving strategic bombing were far and few between. Area bombing was only adopted following the agonizing inability of bomber crews to make precision raids against well defended or distant targets. Throughout the war heavy bombers could rarely hit targets and suffered disastrous losses from anti-aircraft and fighter defences.[2] Area bombing seemed to be the Allied answer to the inaccuracy of Britain’s B-17 and B- 24 bombers in regards to strategic target bombing, however the bombers also had German radar and Luftwaffe to contend with.

Sir Arthur Harris was Air Officer Commanding in Chief of RAF Bomber Command and after cabinet’s agreement to implement Churchill’s policy of area bombing; Harris was tasked with implementing these plans. The First 2 years of the war, in terms of bombing raids, were little more than ‘pinpricks’ in the German war effort. More concerning was the fact that of all the bombs dropped on Germanyby night it was calculated that only 5% hit genuine objectives.[3] Despite the concern that area bombing would mean causing civilian deaths and therefore the blurring of distinction between combatants and non-combatants, Churchill was aware that the German war economy needed to be damaged in order to stop Hitler’s rapid progress across Europe. R.J. Overy uses the term ‘Blitzkrieg economy’ to describe Hitler’s war economy as the war aims were to expand and create an German Empire, in which Germany would gain economic benefits from conquered land.[4] It was Germany’s Blitzkrieg war and mass mobilisation of resources that was conquering Europe on the ground and it was the view of the British command that the area bombing of industrial towns would effect production and morale of German workers. It was not to say that the British command was not aware of the significance of German economy in the event of a war before 1939, as the RAF went into the war with a list of priority targets within the German communications system and in the oil industry.[5] The inability to hit these ‘priority targets’ by Bomber command would led to area bombing of Nazi Germany’s industrial towns and cities.

By early 1942, RAF Chiefs of Staff took the view that as soon as the necessary aircraft were available, Bomber Command should embark on an area bombing offensive.[6] This view was suggests that the British perspective was that the bombing of Nazi controlled industrial towns was integral to the winning of the war. It was more of a question regarding the means of how the Allies would implement such a plan. Britain’s bombers were still suffering heavy losses at this point and the Luftwaffe was in control of European skies. This is despite the fact that in 1940 the Allies were producing 26,714 aircraft in comparison to 16,815 Axis and production would shoot up for the Allies further following the introduction of the U.S. into the war.[7] TheU.S. although provided the Allies through the lend-lease system also provided the RAF greatly with the cooperation of the United States Air Force. With the introduction of American P-51 Mustangs the British B – 17 and B – 24 bombers now had a long range escort to aid in bombing raids on Nazi industrial towns and cities. Nazi Germany’s reliance on foreign aid and production from cities and towns within the range of Allied bombers would prove to be a vital factor in determining the effectiveness of the Nazi war effort.

In July 1943 a new bombing phenomenon referred to as the ‘firestorm’ was implemented as incendiary bombing on

Victims of the Dresden Bombing

Hamburgcaused a new dimension of devastation.[8] Older cities were targeted due to fact they were more open to spread fire, and city centres became the target points for Allied bombers. Although a month later, destruction of German morale was dropped from Bomber Command strategy at the Quebec conference, raids continued and had a demoralising effect on German towns and cities.[9] The scale of these bombings and the mass devastation caused to the industrial areas prompted the use of incendiary area bombing rather than conventional area bombing by the British Command. The scale of the bombing was such that almost as many people were killed in one week of raids on Hamburg in July 1943 as were killed during the entire Blitz on Britain’s cities.[10] This shows the scale on which the Allied bomber offensive was operating at, and the persistence of the bombing raids. The frequency of the raids by the Allied aerial forces may have been simply been due to the fact that the bombers were so inaccurate when it came to hitting primary targets. The more bombs and raids the Allies committed the more chance that they would wipe out important Nazi structures or industrial targets. Another example, even late in the war, is the joint U.S. and British bombing operation over the German city of Dresden between the 13th and 15th February where 60,000 people were killed as the city was repeatedly pulverised.[11] The effectiveness of the British raids on Axis targets seemed to increase throughout the war.

Sir Arthur Harris believed the bombing of Nazi industrial towns and cities was vital in the determining the outcome of the war. He saw the transfer of resources to the activities of the Coastal Command, who were fighting the German threat of U-Boats which were ripping up British trade, as a major diversion of effort from the area offensive.[12]  However, historian Neil Gregor argues that with everything we know now about the Third Reich it leads to the conclusion that the regime would have continued its senseless persecution of the war regardless of the impact bombing had on civilian morale.[13] Although it is now clear that the Nazi command did not care much for civilian morale throughout the war, the economic impact that the Allied bombing effort had on the Nazi war economy was substantial. By late 1944 German transportation was largely dislocated and the war economy saw massive falls in production. More importantly this brought the Luftwaffe away from other fronts to defend the Third Reich, and allowed the allies to ultimately destroy Hitler’s air force.[14] This may explain why morale bombing was discontinued at the Quebec conference as the British Command saw the potential for area bombing in terms of limiting Nazi Germany’s economic capabilities. This also explains why the bombing offensive launched in the spring of 1942, continued until the end of the war. Despite considerable improvements in Bomber Command’s precision capabilities, its overall thrust remained as an area offensive directed principally at civilian targets.[15] It may have been better described as industrial targets but civilian workers are an unfortunate by product and can be seen as a necessary casualty at times of war as the killing of workers reduces production of armaments that could end up killing Allied lives.

The operational range of the Allied B- 17 and B – 24 bombers over Axis controlled Europewas also an important factor in

P51 Mustang helped protect the Allies B-24 bombers

determining the success of the Allied bomber offensive. By 1944 Britainhad an operational range from its south east coast to the likes of Dresdenand Frankfurt. Whilst in the South the joint RAF and USAAF airbase in Foggiacovered Frankfurt, fascist Italyand also targets further east such as, Budapest, Bucharestand Hungary. Russiaalso offered aerial support from the East covering as far as occupied Poland.[16] AlthoughGermany had the ‘Kammhuber Line’ on the west coasts ofFrance up until the coasts ofDenmark, with search lights and radar posts mainlandGermany still suffered devastation in its cities from the allied aerial attacks.   The introduction of the P – 51 Mustangs aided greatly in getting Allied bombers past the German defences in day-time raids as they could challenge the defending Nazi air forces.

Hitler’s strong belief that static aerial defences would prove to be sufficient defence from Allied bombing raids proved to be costly. Hitler focused on 88mm anti-aircraft guns and it became his ‘pride and joy’, as production of the weapon went up greatly.[17] Hitler believed that anti-aircraft fire from the ground was the best form of defence. This proved to be a massive miscalculation as vast number of Allied bombers still got past the anti-aircraft fire as over 20 cities in Germany suffered bombing damage of 50 – 75% destruction by March 1944.[18]  This is not to say that Allied forces did not suffer great losses throughout the Second World War, even during night-time air raids over Germany bombers were in danger. For example in March 1944, the British RAF lost 95 bombers out of the 727 sent to bomb Nuremberg.’[19] There was some effectiveness in Hitler’s aerial defensive line, but he could not prevent the bombing of major German cities to a complete extent.

The Nazi’s also had defensive fighters which proved to be effective in causing the Allies great losses on bombing raids over Axis Europe. This was up until the introduction of the USAAF P – 51 Mustangs whom accompanied the Allied bombers on raids across Europe. However, the German fighter still had strategies in dealing with bombers that got past the anti-aircraft fire. German fighters deployed the tactic of ‘Schrage Musik’ by which they executed a slanting approach from beneath to the blind undersides of the bombers and employed upward-turned cannon.’[20] This was a tactic that contributed to the 95 bombers lost over Nuremberg in 1944, and the Nazi Luftwaffe command were resourceful in terms of deploying aerial tactics. R. J. Overy argues that the fact that Hitler was a foot-soldier, the use of static air defences was favoured by him because he could relate to the weapons used, in this case his apparent fondness for the 88mm anti-aircraft guns. [21] This is why resources were focused on ground defences rather than controlling the skies over Nazi conquered land, therefore the Allies continued to successfully bomb German cities. Hitler’s focus on the superiority of his weaponry in comparison to the Allies rather than the production also cost Germany in terms of aerial dominance over Europe.[22] The British and U.S. were producing more planes and although production was high for the Luftwaffe, operations put in place by the Allies seized dominance from the Axis air forces. Operation Point-Blank was a joint British and U.S. strategic bombing offensive, drawn up at the Quebec Conference, aiming to cripple and destroy German fighter planes.[23] The Allied bomber offensive turned its attention to the actual Nazi air force in 1943 and this may explain why so many cities in Germany received levels of at least 50% destruction from Allied bombing raids by 1944.[24] The Allies, by 1944, had successfully ‘paved’ the way for its bombers to continually bomb Axis controlled towns and cities.

Although the concept of ‘morale bombing’ and the tactic was suspended at the Quebec Conference in 1943, the Allies

Tokyo, example of the ‘blurring of distinction’ between combatant and non-combatant

continued the policy of area bombing claiming it was to cut Nazi Germany’s industrial output. In reality the reduction to Nazi industrial output by bombing was relatively modest until the development of more accurate bomb targeting in 1944.[25] This would suggest that for almost a year the Allies were still ‘morale bombing’ under the cover that its real aim was to upset Axis industrial output, under this all cities under Axis control could potentially be considered a legitimate target. This further supports the belief that the British high command felt that area bombing could bring a quicker end to the war. Earl. R. Beck, claims that most of the Allied bombing could not be considered ‘strategic’ as there was no targeting or destruction of military aims.[26] This further supports the idea that the economic pretences for area bombing were just a continuation of morale bombing against Axis Europe.

It was not just area bombing that was deployed by the Allies over Axis Europe. The Mediterranean Allied Air Force (MAAF) successfully attacked bridges and train yards behind the German front, cutting rail traffic to Romeand the Cassinofront.[27] The Allies realised the importance of the transport links asGermany conquered more and more ofEurope. The Blitzkrieg war deployed by Hitler called for fast mass mobilisation of resources and could easily suffer from the consequences of imperial overstretch. Missions such as these gave the Allied forces the upper hand on the battles fought on the ground as the Nazi’s couldn’t send reserves to aid its forces fighting on the European fronts.

The Allied area bombing offensive over Europe proved to be an effective use of air power against the Axis forces. German cities and centres of production were reduced to ruins and the usage of incendiary bombs after 1943 caused morale splitting devastation over the cities under Axis control. Although civilian casualties were an unfortunate by product of this Allied aerial tactic, the Allies had no accurate bomber or strategic means of precision bombing until 1944, so frequent raids and attacks on Industrial areas and housing of workers were deemed necessary. If we assess the total deaths from area bombing we see that Britainonly suffered 60,000 compared to Italyand Germanyscombined total of 659,796 deaths, 600,000 of which were German.[28] This shows the extent to which Germany was bombed by the Allied forces and the belief among the Allied command that area bombing would bring a quicker conclusion to the war. This also shows how Hitler didn’t value strategic bombing as an effective weapon as the Blitz was relatively small in comparison to Allied raids over Europe. Hitler also put a lot of faith into the unmanned V1 and V2 rockets, supporting R.J. Overy’s view that Hitler believed in superior weaponry rather than producing an effective bombing force.[29]

The adoption of incendiary bombing proved to be the Allies most frequent and effective form of bombing over Axis Europe. We can see the extent of which incendiary explosives were used as the U.S.strategic bombing survey over Europeclaims that 2,455,600 incendiary explosives were used in air raids in comparison to 26,180 explosive bombs.[30] The effectiveness of incendiary bombing was apparent as from 1940 – 43 60% of industrial production was destroyed in Italy by Allied air raids.[31] The operational range of the Allied bombing effort also aided in its effectiveness as from Allied controlled airbases the Allies could virtually attack any point over Axis Europe. This operational spectrum meant that the Allies could attack from 3 sides of Europe and avoid Hitler’s static aerial defences inWestern Europe if needed. Hitler’s reliance on these static defences and 88mm anti-aircraft guns rather than putting more resources into a defensive fighter force, allowed Allied raids to be accompanied with P-51 mustangs and eventually, through operations such as Point-Blank, begin to eliminate the Luftwaffe altogether.

Historian J.M. Spaight claimed as early as 1941, that ‘given the achievement of the task which the British nations have undertaken, to mass overwhelming strength in the air, the Axis must lose.’[32] The belief that the bomber offensive was vital to securing a quick end to the war proved to be vital, as although precision bombing was not fully capable until 1944, area bombing attacked Germany at its heart and on a scale of devastation that would have affected workers morale. Through strategic bombing Axis transport links were crippled and after 1944 production levels fell as the Allies were able to pinpoint industrial targets, thus making sure that the Axis couldn’t turn the tide of the war back in the favour of the Third Reich.


[1] M. Kirby and R. Capey, The Area Bombing ofGermany in World War II: An Operational Research Perspective, The Journal of Operational Research Perspective, vol. 48, no. 7, 1997, pp. 661 – 677, p. 662

[2] Kenneth Hewitt, Place Annihilation: Area Bombing and the fate of Urban Places, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 73, no.2, 1983, pp. 257 – 284, p. 261

[3] M. Kirby and R. Capey, The Area Bombing ofGermany in World War II: An Operational Research Perspective, The Journal of Operational Research Perspective, vol. 48, no. 7, 1997, pp. 661 – 677, p. 663

[4] R. J. Overy, Hitler’s War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation,The Economic History Review, vol 35, no. 2, 1982 pp. 270 – 284, p. 24

[5] M. Kirby and R. Capey, The Area Bombing ofGermany in World War II: An Operational Research Perspective, The Journal of Operational Research Perspective, vol. 48, no. 7, 1997, pp. 661 – 677, p. 662

[6] M. Kirby and R. Capey, The Area Bombing ofGermany in World War II: An Operational Research Perspective, The Journal of Operational Research Perspective, vol. 48, no. 7, 1997, pp. 661 – 677, p. 664

[7] Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, Inc.New York 1987, p. 354 (table 34.)

[8] Kenneth Hewitt, Place Annihilation: Area Bombing and the fate of Urban Places, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 73, no.2, 1983, pp. 257 – 284, p. 265

[9] Martin H. Folly, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of World War II, Palgrave MacMillan 2004, p. 27

[10] Neil Gregor, A Shicksalsgemeinschaft? Allied Bombing, Civilian Morale, and Social Dissolution in Nuremburg, 1942 – 1945, The Historical Journal, vol. 43, no.4, 2000, pp. 1051 – 1070, p. 1051

[11] Martin H. Folly, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of World War II, Palgrave MacMillan 2004, p. 27

[12] M. Kirby and R. Capey, The Area Bombing ofGermany in World War II: An Operational Research Perspective, The Journal of Operational Research Perspective, vol. 48, no. 7, 1997, pp. 661 – 677, p. 670

[13] Neil Gregor, A Shicksalsgemeinschaft? Allied Bombing, Civilian Morale, and Social Dissolution in Nuremburg, 1942 – 1945, The Historical Journal, vol. 43, no.4, 2000, pp. 1051 – 1070, p. 1053

[14] Martin H. Folly, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of World War II, Palgrave MacMillan 2004, p. 27

[15] M. Kirby and R. Capey, The Area Bombing ofGermany in World War II: An Operational Research Perspective, The Journal of Operational Research Perspective, vol. 48, no. 7, 1997, pp. 661 – 677, p. 665

[16] Martin H. Folly, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of World War II, Palgrave MacMillan 2004, Map 27: The Combined Bomber Offensive, p. 27

[17] R.J. Overy, Hitler and Air Strategy, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 15, no. 3, 1980, pp. 405 – 421, p. 409

[18] Martin H. Folly, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of World War II, Palgrave MacMillan 2004, Map 27: The Combined Bomber Offensive, p. 27

[19] Earl R. Beck, The Allied Bombing ofGermany, 1942-1945, and the German Response: Dilemmas of Judgment, German Studies Review, vol. 5, no. 3, 1982, pp. 325 – 337, p. 331

[20] Earl R. Beck, The Allied Bombing ofGermany, 1942-1945, and the German Response: Dilemmas of Judgment, German Studies Review, vol. 5, no. 3, 1982, pp. 325 – 337, p. 331

[21] R.J. Overy, Hitler and Air Strategy, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 15, no. 3, 1980, pp. 405 – 421, p. 409

[22] R.J. Overy, Hitler and Air Strategy, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 15, no. 3, 1980, pp. 405 – 421, p. 409

[23] Wesley Frank Craven & James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces In World War 2, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943, Indiana Magazine of History, vol. 46, no. 2, 1950, pp. 209 – 211, p. 209

[24] Martin H. Folly, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of World War II, Palgrave MacMillan 2004, Map 27: The Combined Bomber Offensive, p. 27

[25] Earl R. Beck, The Allied Bombing ofGermany, 1942-1945, and the German Response: Dilemmas of Judgment, German Studies Review, vol. 5, no. 3, 1982, pp. 325 – 337, p. 332

[26] Earl R. Beck, The Allied Bombing ofGermany, 1942-1945, and the German Response: Dilemmas of Judgment, German Studies Review, vol. 5, no. 3, 1982, pp. 325 – 337, p. 329

[27] Henry D. Lytton, Bombing Policy in theRome and Pre-Normandy Invasion Aerial Campaigns of World War II: Bridge Bombing Strategy Vindicated and Railyard Bombing Strategy Invalidated, Military Affairs, vol. 47. no. 2, pp. 53 – 58, p. 54

[28] Kenneth Hewitt, Place Annihilation: Area Bombing and the fate of Urban Places, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 73, no.2, 1983, pp. 257 – 284, p. 263

[29] R.J. Overy, Hitler and Air Strategy, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 15, no. 3, 1980, pp. 405 – 421, p. 416

[30] Earl R. Beck, The Allied Bombing ofGermany, 1942-1945, and the German Response: Dilemmas of Judgment, German Studies Review, vol. 5, no. 3, 1982, pp. 325 – 337, p. 333

[31] Martin H. Folly, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of World War II, Palgrave MacMillan 2004, Map 27: The Combined Bomber Offensive, p. 27

[32] J.M. Spaight, The War in the Air: Second Phase, Foreign Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2, 1941, pp. 402 – 413, p. 413

Importance of Teaching Genocide

The Second World War is infamously portrayed by the rise of Hitler’s Nazi ideologies, coupled with the physical adoption of his most terrible ‘Final Solution’. This is certainly an event that has, and rightly so still is, one of the first subjects that spring to mind when the Second World War is mentioned in Western cultures.
Genocide, the most terrible example of humanities inability to see past human differences, is far from an extinct practice. Before the death camps of the Final Solution, there have been century’s of ‘ethnic cleansing’, whether it be in the name of God, or by the colour of a persons skin. The First World War saw the Armenian Genocide where 600,000 to over

Auschwitz ‘Work sets you free’

1.5 million people were murdered under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The Holocaust, in total, is estimated to have taken up to 6 million Jewish lives and if we compare the death toll to that of ethnic Chinese civilians who were victims of Japanese war crimes we see the murder of an estimated 23 million people.
It is difficult to draw comparisons between such unspeakable acts of atrocious murder, but it is important that such events are not forgotten. Although western culture has not necessarily ‘forgotten’ the Japanese war atrocities, I feel it may deserve more of a place in understanding the horrors of human nature and war in Western teaching and culture. This is not to say that China, Asia and even the Middle East grasp onto the Holocaust as the West does, far from it in fact. Obviously a nation will focus on the events that deeply effect them as an national community, the Rape of Nanking where up to 300,000 people were massacred in horrendous systematic fashion is prominent in the remembrance the second Sino-Japanese War by the Chinese. In contrast many Arab states still deny the existence of the Holocaust, mainly due to the past and on going Arab-Israeli conflicts which has coincidently, led Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf’ to become a best seller in many of these states today.
We appear to pick and choose, not deliberately, but mainly psychologically, as naturally we unilaterally align ourselves, and let ourselves be effected by the events that we can most relate to. It is important that a nation teaches to cater some sense of national pride, Britain for example sees the victory in the Second World War as such, and Winston Churchill has become a symbol of English national patriotism. A nation must also teach the atrocities so that future generations will not make the same mistake, although unfortunately this is rarely the case.

Hotel Rwanda Film 2004

The Rwandan genocide in 1994 where up to 800,000 people were murdered, although widely reported at the time and U.N. intervention, may have been forgotten if it wasn’t for the film ‘Hotel Rwanda’ (2004). For people around the same age as me (21)may have had little to no knowledge of the Rwandan genocide like myself. I only recently (upon research for my dissertation on the Holocaust) learn’t about the Armenian Genocide. It is my belief that many people that leave school, at GCSE or A-Level or even after graduation from university, only leave with the Holocaust as their only concept and understanding of ethnic cleansing and genocide. There is much more to genocide, the grass roots can be attributed almost always to economics and greed. Religious crusades implemented by Kings and religious leaders merely to convert, tax and take from the ‘unbelievers’ and the rise of right wing parties such as the Nazi party and following the recent world recession the Golden Dawn party in greece, which ultimately attributes ‘foreigners’ and ‘ethnics’ to the country’s economic problems.
In Britain it is only through our high standards of education that we only see a minority of supporters for parties such as the BNP and the UKIP (whom I’d describe as cloak and dagger right wing party). Groups such as the EDL have risen in numbers since the ‘war on terror’ and the economic crisis also but upon evaluation of its members we see the everyday stereotypes  associated with nationalism; the skinheads, the football hooligans and a minority of trade and public sector workers whom may have lost work to foreigners.
Ultimately, my conclusion to this disorganised rant is that just teaching the Holocaust (which is important) and not mentioning previous genocides and modern genocides is just as bad as discrediting the importance of Holocaust itself. If we were to leave school with the knowledge that the Nazis hated and murdered Jews but that was the be all and end all of such atrocities, we remain knowledgeable of the Holocaust but ignorant to genocide and ethnic cleansing. Which in my view disgraces all those who died at the hands of the Nazis or the Japanese or before that the Ottoman Empire.

The Wealth that won’t Trickle Down

The richer man has the lighter wallet yet again, whilst we struggle with heavy wallets saving up our coppers.

 Whether I truly understand the severity of the current economic crisis or not, the politicians promise that we were ‘all in this together’ is looking like another standard lie. The cutting of the tax rate to those who earn over £150,000 looks to be standard Conservative procedure, however they are raising the tax threshold of when people should start paying tax to just over £9,000. This would leave the comfortably rich better off and save young people just starting jobs around ‘£200 a year’ (BBC). This however, in my view seems to be a ploy to give the ‘younger unemployed’ such as myself, a minuscule hand whilst recruitment for public sector jobs is frozen and the cost of living rises. 4.4 million pensioners will also be worse off as age-related tax allowances are to be frozen or removed, it would seem that the young and the wealthy are to be supported through the exploitation of their grandparents. I don’t see the creation of many jobs or introduction of foreign investment if companies and big earners avoided the previous 50% tax, why would the 45% suddenly become appetising? The same goes for corporation tax falling to 24% this year and 22% by 2014. I just do not see how such minuscule tax incentives, at the cost of those who are struggling to maintain the lifestyle that they deserve, are a viable option.

The closure of the Remploy factories in Wrexham, where 272 disabled workers lost their jobs and will be very lucky to find new ones, were done so because the factories were not considered ‘financially viable’. How can the Tories and partly (I suppose) the Lib Dems implement tax cuts for the rich, who will NOT provide these disabled workers jobs, whilst damaging the lives of the vulnerable in our society? The simply unforgivable excuse given by the Tories is that the rich ‘avoid paying it anyway’, well Mr. Cameron why don’t you try and close the existing loopholes that allow such undemocratic use of British money?

Have an income of £20,000 be £220 per annum better off.
Have an income of £1,000,000 be £40,000 better off.

Don’t even get me started on the NHS (cutting jobs and equipment will not improve healthcare!!! Good job Eton schoolboys are all private healthcare), or the in-balance’s regarding the investment in the South and the North of England or the extra £500 million put into the Olympic games, of which most of us will not be involved in, or the cutting of benefits to the disabled. The tax cuts reward those who look for work, but cuts to the private sector and the cutting of jobs is creating a job market that most postgraduates cannot compete in and leave those without qualifications and many students to find cash in hand work.

Sometimes I think that the politicians forget that it was the rich who got us into this mess. The current government would rather hold onto the rich than the skilled. There are very few incentives for Doctors, Nurses, Scientists, Engineers the list goes on, to remain in the UK, these people are our future. They make use of the wealth of the few and provide it to the majority, rather than it being passed between the same bloated hands.

Hormonal Hostile Takeover: Beliebers on Twitter.

Twitter is a great social networking site. Its short, concise, easy to use and we can all legally stalk our favourite celebrities and musical or sporting heroes. The concept of ‘# trends’ keeps us well informed of what is going on in single cities and places around the world.

So taking all this into account I effectively abandon my Facebook account for a few weeks to seek glory and unneeded knowledge on Twitter. Everything is going great, I tweet Piers Morgan to let him know how much of an egotistical dick-head he is, and follow some hilarious accounts such as ‘@Chino_wanker’ and follow various accounts providing up to date information about Luton Town F.C. I didn’t really take much notice of the worldwide trends.

A few weeks into using Twitter, now only using Facebook to keep informed of event invites and so on, I start to notice that there are loads of fan-made accounts, I was aware of this before, but I didn’t realise that Twitter was peppered with Bieber fans, Lady Gaga fans, One – Direction fans, JLS fans, the list goes on. Fuck me. You can’t escape the army of hormonally dangerous ‘ beliebers’, he’s like some sort of God to them. Perhaps he is the spawn of Satan and the world really is going to end this year, in the form of an angry spotty greasy wave of riots all being controlled by Biebers dick.

Now all I notice every-week is that there’s a worldwide trend set by one of these groups of fans. Stuff such as #bieber is perfect or #Lady Gaga is the queen of pop. Maybe computers and the internet are taking too much of our time. Look at me now, writing an article on the internet at 1:35am (got to be up a 9am), about the internet.. my point is that it feels more like a cult following than a musical following. It’s like those religious nutters you get knocking on your door trying to force Jesus down your throat, I’m starting to feel like these beliebers are trying force Bieber on me. Its like I’m a cow and these bieber fans are chasing me with a red hot branding iron aimed straight at my balls, with a big bieber sign on it, no one wants Bieber on their balls….

I still use Twitter and I haven’t got my balls burn’t so I’m tolerating all this pop-industry twittering. I’m just glad those people most probably hate the music I like, which is nice, there are certain types of people you would rather not be associated with in life after-all. Murderers, pedos, racists, towie fans, the Sun newspaper readers, Piers Morgan, Adrian Durham and of course Beliebers.

@chungltfc

Evergreen – The Flaming Sex Panthers

Side project by me and house mates, gets crazy after about the 1:35 mark. Spread the word if your feeling it.
All filmed with nothing but an iphone, we don’t need that fancy shit!

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